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Bolden (Jason) v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 28 (Jul. 08, 2021)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE AFFIDAVIT 




 When the State seeks and obtains leave from a district court to proceed against the accused 
by information, it must support that motion with an affidavit of any person who has knowledge of 
the commission of an offense and is a competent witness to testify. This affidavit requirement can 
be satisfied with a preliminary hearing transcript. The district court may grant this leave on the 




 The Appellee, the State, filed a criminal complaint against the Appellant, James Bolden, 
and the matter proceeded to a preliminary hearing in justice court. The Appellant was charged after 
he approached Brenton and Bryston Martinez outside of a Las Vegas apartment building and fired 
seven shots. The shots made contact with Brenton and the wall of an occupied apartment. 
Immediately after this incident the Appellant was identified as the shooter by Brenton after police 
showed him a photo. Bryston told the police that he saw the shooter and provided a description 
that matched the Appellant.  
 Both Brenton and Bryson Martinez testified at the preliminary hearing but gave testimony 
that contradicted their original statements to the police. Bryston denied having seen the shooter, 
despite telling the police he had on the day of the shooting. Brenton testified that he did not 
recognize the Appellant and that he had no recollection of what the shooter looked like, despite 
positively identifying him on the day of the shooting. The justice of the peace noted the 
inconsistency between the brothers’ statements to the police and their subsequent testimony at 
preliminary hearing. She found the brothers to lack credibility because of these inconsistencies. 
She additionally found their statements about drinking and using drugs on the day of the shooting 
undermined the reliability of their statements to the police. For those reasons, the justice of the 
peace did not find probable cause and sua sponte dismissed all the charges against the Appellant.  
 The State filed a motion under NRS 173.035(2), seeking leave to proceed by information.2 
The State supported its motion by attaching a copy of the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
from justice court. The motion was granted unopposed. At trial, Brenton positively identified the 
Appellant as the shooter. That identification along with the 911 call and Bryston’s description of 
the shooter were all admitted into evidence. The jury convicted the Appellant of illegal possession 
of a firearm, battery with a deadly weapon, and seven counts of discharging a firearm at or into an 




 The Appellant failed to oppose the State’s motion for leave and as such forfeited all but 
plain error review. In order for the court to consider the forfeited error the appellant must 
 
1  By Greer Sullivan.  
2  See NEV. REV. STAT.§ 173.035(2) (2007).  
demonstrate that: (1) there was an error; (2) the error is plain, meaning that it is clear under current 
law from a casual interpretation; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The 
Court found that the appellant’s substantial rights were potentially affected. 
 The only procedure that was not in line perfectly with the requirements of NRS 173.035(2) 
was the State’s use of a preliminary hearing transcript instead of an affidavit. The Appellant argued 
that because a preliminary hearing transcript is not an affidavit that the district court should have 
rejected the State’s motion. The Court concedes that the statute refers only to an affidavit and does 
not provide affidavit equivalents. However, the Court found that under NRS 53.045, which allows 
a court to consider certain unsworn declarations in lieu of an affidavit, a preliminary hearing 
transcript qualified as a declaration that satisfies NRS 53.045.  
 The Court discussed a similar case of statutory construction from California where an anti-
SLAPP statute allowed for the court to consider “supporting and opposing affidavits” when ruling 
on a special motion to dismiss.3 A grand jury transcript was found to be an acceptable substitute 
under a similar California statute that permitted certain unsworn declarations as affidavit 
equivalents.4 The California court in Sweetwater, found that the grand jury transcript was an 
acceptable substitute because it is at least as reliable as an affidavit. The Court applied this to the 
current case and found that a certified preliminary hearing was an acceptable substitute because 
when looking at the policy purposes of this statute there would be no reason to prohibit use of an 
acceptable affidavit substitute in order to employ strict compliance with the affidavit requirement. 
The Court found that the district court did not err in granting the State’s motion for leave because 
the certified preliminary hearing transcript provided an accurate way for the district court to 
determine whether the justice of the peace made an egregious error in determining probable cause. 
 The Court additionally upheld the district court’s finding that the justice of the peace made 
an egregious error in not finding probable cause. The preliminary hearing is not a trial and if an 
inference of criminal agency can be drawn from the evidence then it is proper for the justice of the 
peace to draw it. The slight or marginal evidence standard at the preliminary hearing does not 
permit the justice of the peace to dismiss charge where evidence permits the finder of fact to draw 
an inference of criminal agency. Despite conflicting evidence, the State presented enough evidence 
for the inference of criminal agency and the justice of the peace committed an egregious error by 
preventing a jury from making a credibility argument. The Court additionally held that the State 
presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction because the Appellant was identified as the 
shooter in a 911 call and Brenton’s photo identification, which were both made shortly after the 
shooting. This evidence supported a rational juror finding the Appellant was the perpetrator 




The State’s motion for leave to proceed to district court after the justice of the peace 
dismissed all charges substantially complied with NRS 173.035(2) and demonstrated that the 
justice of the peace committed an egregious error. Additionally, there was substantial evidence to 




3  See Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 6 Cal. 5th 931, 434 P.3d 1152 (2019), see also  
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(2) (West 2016). 
4  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2015.5 (West 1983).  
